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Abstract 
The term exaptation, coined by Gould and Vrba, refers to those characters that are useful for 
survival but that were not selected for this purpose. In this paper I will focus on the notion of 
exaptation in socio economic systems and on its implications for a theory of economic 
change. In socio-economic systems, an exaptation is the result of a process through which the 
initial attribution of new functionalities to existing socio-economic entities (agents, artifacts, 
social institutions) leads to new entities and new relationships between entities.  The notion 
of exaptation forces to examine the processes of change in socio-economic systems in terms 
of an interaction-based ontology that I will provide, following the complexity theory of 
innovation. I will use this ontology to highlight how processes of economic change can be 
analysed in terms of emergent phenomena and in particular in terms of the emergence of new 
specific functionalities and  qualitatively new entities and relationships. I will refer these 
processes to the relationships between agent and artifacts, and to the organization of the 
economy and society. This second type of process of emergence will be examined with 
reference to the changing characteristics and functions of the division of labour emerging 
from the historical processes of interaction between quantitative and qualitative changes of 
production relations. I will conclude that economic change cannot be analysed in terms of a 
mere recombination of existing things or in terms of selection-variation mechanisms. It must 
be analysed through the dynamic historical process by which “a new thing leads to another”. 
In these processes of transformation the causality links are themselves the results of processes 
in which ex ante potential causality links can be transformed into different (and new) 
effective (or actual) causality links. 
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For a long time, the idea that the origin of what exists can be deduced from its 
actual functionality (or utility) has been dominant. This idea conditioned evolutionary 
thinking and found its expression in the notion of adaptation through selection. It is 
only with the contributions of Gould, Lewontin, and Vrba that an interpretative 
perspective different from the adaptive theory has emerged and a word to identify 
such a perspective has been coined: the term exaptation. In particular, Gould and 
Vrba coined the term exaptation to refer to those characters that are useful for 
survival but that were not selected for this purpose.  
In this paper I will focus on the notion of exaptation in socio economic systems 
and on its implications for a theory of economic change. In socio-economic systems, 
an exaptation is the result of a process through which the initial attribution of new 
functionalities to existing socio-economic entities (agents, artifacts, social 
institutions) leads to new entities and new relationships between entities.  I will argue 
that exaptations are the expression of the general phenomenon of the emergence of 
new specific functionalities and new entities. The main implication of the exaptation-
based perspective highlighted in the following pages is that it leads us to analyse 
economic change in terms of processes through which relationships defining entities 
involved in economic processes change as a result of the human action embedded in 
such relationships, giving rise to new outcomes (in terms of new entities). 
Exaptations are induced by and induce qualitative changes resulting from interacting 
social processes. Exaptation processes do not have a purpose known in advance: they 
produce effects to the extent that they give rise to new agents, new artifacts, new 
social institutions. 
In order to grasp the implications of the concept of exaptation, the paper is 
organized as follow. First of all, in section 2, the concept of exaptation will be 
highlighted by comparing the adaptation-based and the exaptation-based 
perspectives. In section 3, I will provide an essential interaction-based ontology 
defining concepts and entities for the analysis of exaptation processes as  emergent 
phenomena in socio-economic systems. In sections 4 and 5, this ontology will be 
used to discuss how the emergence of new functionalities, new entities, and new 
relationships can be analysed at a theoretical level. In particular, in section 4 I will 
consider the emergence of new functionalities, new artifacts and new markets, and in 
section 5 the emergence of new functionalities at the level of the organization of 
production and society. This second type of process of emergence is examined with 
reference to what can be considered an essential character of all forms of society: the 
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division of labour which, as history teaches us, came into being along with the first 
forms of societies. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks on the implications 
of the notion of exaptation for a theory of economic change. 
2. Adaptation and exaptation: two paradigms compared 
In evolutionary biology the term adaptation is used to indicate a mechanism of 
selection of what has become adapted to a certain pre-existent functionality. In 
general, the “concept of adaptation implies that there is a pre-existent form, problem, 
or ideal to which organisms are fitted by a dynamical process” (Levins and Lewontin, 
1985, p. 67). According to this perspective, through selection organisms adapt 
themselves to a pre-existent environment and must evolve in order to maintain their 
state of adaptation as the external environment changes. Once the idea that evolution 
is the result of a process of adaptation through selection is accepted, each element of 
an organism – whether it  is part of a living organism or of an artifact or of society – 
has its origin in the function that it currently performs. The feathered wings of birds, 
for example, should have originated in flight because they are adapted to flight just as 
the human eye, an organ of extreme perfection, should have been formed by natural 
selection. 
Darwin was perfectly aware that such a theory of evolution could not be applied 
to the cases in which organs or characters originally designed for a function are co-
opted for another function. In chapter six of the Sixth edition (1872) of the Origin of 
the Species entitled “Difficulties of the theory”, for example, Darwin argues that  the 
case of the swim bladder in fish shows that an organ originally  designed for the 
hydrostatic function can be transformed for another entirely different function, the 
respiratory function. Another case considered by Darwin is related to the cranial 
sutures of mammals, which are useful and even indispensable for birth, but are not 
selected for this purpose, for they are also present in the cranium of birds and reptiles. 
Thus, a characteristic that emerged for some other reason — whether connected or 
not with the process of natural selection — was co-opted for a different use. Darwin 
did not think that cases like the swim bladder in fish or the cranial sutures of 
mammals could question his theory. For a long time, after Darwin, “anomalous cases”  
of organs originally designed for a function and subsequently co-opted for another 
function were considered as “pre-adaptations” to the new function. 
It is only with the contribution of Gould and Lewontin (1979), Gould and Vrba 
(1982) and Gould (2002) that an interpretative perspective different from the adaptive 
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theory has emerged and a word by which to identify such a perspective has been 
coined. In particular, Gould and Vrba (1982) used the term exaptation to refer to 
those characters that contribute to survival but that were developed for other reasons. 
Feathers, for example, originally selected for thermoregulation, later were co-opted 
by birds for flying (Gould, 2002 p. 1232). In other words, feathers are apt for flying 
in virtue of their ex form: they are ex-apt.  
Gould’s insight about the importance of changes of functionalities attributed to 
existing entities has an interesting antecedent. As Gould (2002, pp. 1214-1218) 
recognized, the principle according to which historical origin and current utility 
cannot be related to each other as if the origin derived from the utility, was illustrated 
in 1887 by Nietzsche in an essay entitled On the Genealogy of Morals. In section 12 
of the second dissertation in this essay, Nietzsche discusses the origin and the purpose 
of a legal institution, punishment. He argues that origin and purpose of punishment 
should be dissociated inasmuch as a legal institution is an example of how an already 
existing thing is “always reinterpreted” and “adapted to new utilities”. Nietzsche 
seems to attribute to these continuous re-interpretations and adaptations to new 
purposes a general value as a important aspect in human activities. It follows that, 
according to Nietzsche, even if “you have understood perfectly the usefulness of any 
physiological organ (or legal institution, social custom, political usage, art form or 
religious rite) you have not yet thereby grasped how it emerged” for “every purpose 
and use is just a sign that the will to power has achieved mastery over something less 
powerful”. In the following passage, Nietzsche denies that the development of a 
thing, an organ, a tradition is a continuous progress towards a goal and admits that, in 
the process of ongoing new interpretations and adaptations to new secondary 
purposes, contingent elements are present. “The whole history of a ‘thing’, an organ, 
a tradition can to this extent be a continuous chain of signs, continually revealing new 
interpretations and adaptations, the causes of which need not to be connected even 
among themselves, but rather sometimes just follow and replace one another at 
random. The ‘development’ of a thing, a tradition, an organ is therefore certainly not 
its progressus toward a goal, still less is it a logical progressus, … instead it is a 
succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of 
subjugation  exacted on a thing”. 
 
2.1 A comparison between the adaptation-based and the exaptation-based perspective 
 
To synthesize the main differences between adaptation and exaptation, we can 
compare these two perspectives according to three elements: (a) the types of 
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processes in action; (b) the relationships between process, structure and function; (c) 
the relationship between current functionality and the origin of an entity. In very 
general terms, but I will return to this in a more accurate way in section 3, the 
structure of an entity2 is the description of its parts (its different components) and the 
way in which they interact. The functionality of an entity depends on the properties 















Tab. 1 Adaptation vs exaptation  
 
According to the adaptation-based paradigm (see tab. 1), the process of natural 
selection shapes the structure of entities for a current function. It follows that 
adaptation through selection leads to a given relationship between structure and a pre-
existent function. If the functionality of an entity is considered as an end, known in 
advance, toward which natural selection is directed, the origin of an entity can be 
deduced from its current functionality. By contrast, in terms of the three elements 
mentioned above, we can characterize exaptation as follows (see tab. 1): an initial 
process through which entities, with a given current functionality, are coopted for a 
new use (a new functionality), leads to new entities with a new relationship between 
structure and function. An exaptation changes the relationships between structure and 
                                                 
2 I refer to entities in very general terms. Entities are organisms (or individual characters of an 
organism), artifacts, agents, organizations, social institutions. Following the complexity-based theory 
of innovation, I define an entity in term of three interacting elements: its structure, its functionality 
and its processes of transformation (see Lane et al, 2009). For a more accurate definition of agents, 
artifacts and social institutions in socio-economic systems see section 3 below. 
Processes Relationship between 
process, structure and 
function
Relationship between current  
functionality and the origin of an 
entity
ADAPTATION Natural selection 
shapes the structure of 
entities for a current 
function
Adaptation through 
selection leads to a given 
relationship between 
structure and a pre-existent 
function  
The origin of an entity can be 
deduced from its current 
functionality inasmach as 
functionality is considered as an end,  
known in advance, toward which 
natural selection is directed
EXAPTATION From an initial attribution 
of a new functionalitiy to 
an existing entity,  an 
exaptation changes the 
relationship between 
structure and function
The origin of an entity cannot be 
deduced from its current 
functionality. To trace the origin of an 
entity it is necessary to examine the 
changes in functionality that have 
occurred in time
Entities with a given 
current functionality are 
coopted for a new use
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function. It follows that the origin of an entity cannot be deduced from its current 
functionality; to trace the origin of an entity it is necessary to examine the changes in 
functionality that have occurred over time. 
 
2.2 Defining exaptation in socio-economic systems 
 
Since the publication of the essay by Gould and Vrba, the notion of exaptation 
has received a wide audience not only in biology but also in other  fields of research3. 
Defining the notion of exaptation in socio-economic systems, Mokyr refers to the 
idea that “a technique that was originally selected for one trait owes its later success 
and survival to another trait which it happens to possess” (Mokyr 2000, p. 57). Dew, 
Sarasvathy and Venkataraman (2004) do not go beyond this definition. According to 
Lane (2011), exaptation plays a key role in the dynamic of innovation. An exaptation 
happens when new patterns of interaction emerge around artifacts already in use, 
giving rise to new attributions of functionalities4. “The idea here is that artifacts gain 
their meaning through use, and not all the possible meanings that can arise when 
agents begin to incorporate new artifacts in patterns of use could have been 
anticipated by the designers and producers of those artifacts” (Lane, 2011, p. 69). In 
more general terms, I define5 an exaptation in socio-economic systems “as a result of 
a set of interacting processes through which an initial attribution of a new 
functionality to existing outcomes of human activity – whether they are artifacts, 
organizations, scientific achievements or cultural models – leads to new outcomes.” 
(Bonifati  and Villani, 2013, pp. 172).  
According to this definition of exaptation, it is not sufficient to attribute a new 
functionality to an existing entity in order to obtain a new entity as exaptation of a 
pre-existing one. A successful exaptation requires a set of processes of development 
of new entities and new relationship between entities.  It is worth mentioning another 
aspect of the definition of exaptation just given, namely the meaning to be attributed 
to the adjective “new” qualifying the word “functionality”. We can identify two 
different meanings. The first one is related to an existing functionality attributed, for 
example, to an existing artifact designed to meet a different purpose. In this case, an 
                                                 
3 For references see Gould (2002), pp. 1234-1246. For research in linguistics,  see Lass (1990) and  
Traugott (2004). 
4 Since new functionalities give rise to new artifacts and to new patterns of interaction that, in turn, 
give rise to attributions, Lane refers to this process as “a bootstrapping dynamic that can produce 
cascades of changes in agent-artifact space” (Lane, 2011, p. 69). 
5 See Bonifati (2010), Bonifati and Villani (2013) and Bonifati (2013). 
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existing functionality is “new” in relation to an existing artifact to which previously 
such a functionality was not attributed.  A  second different meaning is related to 
cases in which a transformation in the context in which an entity is embedded gives 
rise to functionalities that did not previously exist. In section 4 I will argue that in 















Tab. 2 Some typical examples of new artifacts with new functionalities that emerged as exaptations 
from already existing artifacts designed for different functionalities.  
Sources: Basalla (1988), Rosenberg (1996), Dew, Sarasvathy, and Venkataraman, S. (2004). 
 
Tab. 2 summarizes some typical examples of new artifacts with functionalities 
that emerged as exaptations from already existing artifacts designed for  different 
functionalities. The phonograph, invented by Edison as a dictating machine in 1877, 
was successfully co-opted for a different use: a tool for automatically playing popular 
music in the first jukebox, which became the first major use of the new technology 
(see Basalla, 1988).  
After its invention, the laser was implemented with no specific purpose. In fact, 
Bell’s patent lawyers thought that it would find no commercial application in 
telecommunication. The laser technology gave rise to many new products only when 
new functionalities were attributed to it and many complementary technologies were 
invented and jointly implemented with already existing technologies. From these 
processes, the laser rangefinder, new micro-surgical laser instruments,  the barcode 
laser scanner and new cutting instruments and new processes emerged (see 
Rosenberg, 1996). 
Existing artifact Original specific 
functionalities
New specific functionalities New artifacts
phonograph dictating machine automatic playing of popular 
music 
jukebox
laser no specific purpose precision measurement laser rangefinder
to cause scarring micro-surgical laser 
reading barcodes barcode laser scanner









wireless telegraph to communicate 
at a distance 





The last two examples in the table concern the development of wireless 
communication technology(see Basalla, 1988). This technology started as a 
laboratory tool designed by Hertz to test Maxwell's theories on electromagnetic 
waves. Its initial designed functionality was to accurately measure the 
electromagnetic waves. By applying Hertz's laboratory tool to a new and different 
purpose, Marconi developed a new artifact – the wireless telegraph – with a new 
functionality, that of ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore one-to-one communication. A new 
system of relationships around the wireless telegraphy activated a new functionality 
of distance communication: the transmission of sound. This new functionality was 
activated in connection with the emergence of new knowledge and new capabilities in 
wireless telegraphy. New technologies were developed and new artifacts emerged, in 
particular wireless telephone and broadcast radio, a new artifact allowing one-to-
many voice communication. 
3. An essential interaction-based ontology 
To grasp the implications of the notion of exaptation for the theory of economic 
change, it is first of all worth defining a socio-economic system in terms of the 
following characteristics: 
(a) Interactivity. Agents (individuals or organizations) are embedded in a 
system of relationships involving a set of socio-economic entities: other 
agents, artifacts, social institutions. 
(b) Distributed knowledge. Knowledge and capabilities generated in a socio-
economic system are distributed among many entities: agents, artifacts able 
to store the results of human learning, social institutions. 
(c) Intentionality. Agents act in accordance with a purpose taking into account 
entities and systems of relationships between entities. 
(d) Endogenous change. Since agents’ actions generate new knowledge, new 
entities and new relationships, socio-economic systems change as an 
endogenous result of a series of interacting processes.  
 
The peculiar characteristic of the exaptation perspective in socio-economic 
systems is to focus attention on a series of ongoing changes, in primis in 
functionalities attributed to existing entities and from this to the emergence of new 
entities and new relationships among entities. The analysis of changes in socio-
economic systems requires  an appropriate essential interaction-based ontology that I 
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will give in this section by defining three types of entities: agents, artifacts and social 
institutions. In order to provide these definitions, I will use the notions of interaction, 
process, functionality, and uncertainty, the meanings of which it is worth clarifying 
first. 
An interaction is anything that gives rise to a reciprocal action (influence) 
between the entities involved. In human social activities, interactions take place, for 
example, in dialogues or negotiations (in which agents act reciprocally with each 
other) and in consumption and production activities (in which agents, as defined 
below, act reciprocally with others agents, with artifacts and with the  environment). 
Interactions are basic elements for processes. In very general terms, I define 
processes as ongoing systems of interactions whose peculiar characteristic is to 
produce patterns of changes. It follows that processes are sets of changes triggered by 
systems of interactions. Any aspect of human activity can give rise to specific 
processes of change, but all processes in human activity require and give rise to 
learning processes. It follows that an essential and general characteristic of human 
processes is that they are cognition processes emerging from dynamic interactions 
among humans and/or between humans and nature6.  
The notion of functionality is defined in terms of specific modalities of use of 
an entity. In this definition, a functionality is not a substitute for the purpose known in 
advance toward which processes of change are directed, as in the adaptation through 
selection paradigm. Instead, I consider functionalities as emergent specific uses.  
Agents, as defined below, act in conditions of uncertainty in which the 
emergence of new artifacts, new patterns of interaction and new functionalities 
generates perpetual novelty that makes prediction impossible. This is the notion of 
ontological uncertainty7  put forward by Lane and Maxfield (2005). 
It is worth  clarifying that the definition of functionality given above (that 
implies the absence of a goal known in advance) and the presence of ontological 
uncertainty do not imply that agents have a blind behaviour, but simply that, a priori, 
                                                 
6 See Vygotskij (1978), cap. 5. Vygotsky expressly acknowledges his debt to Engels’s dialectical 
method. See Engels (1883). 
7 Ontological uncertainty derives from conditions of perpetual novelty in which not only are agents 
unable to decide which consequences will happen as a result of actions they contemplate taking, but 
also the very criteria of value with which these consequences would have to be expressed simply do 
not exist at the historical moment in which agents must act. Ontological uncertainty, as defined by 
Lane and Maxfield, has relevant points of contact with the Keynesian notion of uncertainty. See in 
particular the meaning in which Keynes uses the term 'uncertain' knoweledge to refer to everything 
for which “there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever” (Keynes 
1937, p. 113).  For the difference between the notion of ontological uncertainty and Knight’s notion 
of  uncertainty, see Lane and Maxfield (2005, pp. 9-10).  
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when taking a direction agents have no guarantees to arrive where they had 
prefigured to arrive. This is a fundamental ingredient of emergent phenomena that 




In socio economic systems,  agents’ actions can be defined only with respect to 
the system of relationships in which agents are embedded. This must be understood in 
a non-simplistic sense. For example, when Marconi attributed a new functionality to 
Hertz’s instrument, considered until then as an instrument for measuring 
electromagnetic waves, he used in a new way the distributed knowledge common to 
other agents. This generated new social knowledge, new artifacts, new entities and 
new relationships. Similar considerations  apply for the behaviour of a firm that opens 
a new path of innovations. Note that the use of distributed knowledge requires the 
interaction with other entities. These examples suggest that in socio economic 
systems actions are social actions and that agents, even when we refer to individuals, 
must be defined in terms of entities organizing actions for a certain purpose. It 
follows that in socio-economic systems, as defined above, agents have to be thought 
of as organizations. Following Lane (Lane at al. 2009; Lane 2011),  an organization is 
defined in terms of the interaction between structure, function and processes. The 
structure of an organization describes its parts (energetic, material and informational), 
the interaction modalities among its parts, and the modalities through which the 
organization interacts with other organizations. The processes associated with an 
organization describe the transformations (within the organization) in which the 
organization may participate. The function of an organization gives directedness to its 
actions. Organizations, so defined, are the subject of action in socio-economic 
systems. It follows that we can define an agent as “an organization of human beings 
and artifacts in the name of which social action is initiated and executed” (Lane et al. 
2009, p. 26).  
In order to function, socio-economic systems require a continuous flow of 
actions by agents. Among these, actions that change a particular system of 
relationships in which agents are embedded can be defined as innovative actions. 
Note that, because of ontological uncertainty, innovative actions require agents’ 
capability to act by prefiguring entities and relationships between entities that do not 
exist at the time when agents take such an action. The examples mentioned above are 






Like agents, artifacts – both tangible (consumer goods, capital goods) and 
intangible (know-how, services or legislation) – can be defined in terms of three 
interacting elements: structure, functionalities and processes of transformation 
(Bonifati, 2010, p. 749). The structure of an artifact is determined by its material 
characteristics, by the processes of transformation that the matter has undergone as a 
result of human labour oriented by a project, and by the way in which its different 
components, which are themselves artifacts, interact. The functionalities of an artifact 
depend on the properties attributed to it in relation to its usefulness for some specific 
use. The interaction between structure and functionalities is governed by the 
processes through which the functionalities are attributed and the matter is 
transformed. It follows that artifacts emerge from a social process.  
 
3.3 Socio-economic institutions (with particular reference to markets) 
 
A socio-economic institution can be defined, in very general terms, as a set of 
rules and conventions governing a particular system of relationships functioning in 
socio-economic systems. In order to grasp the meaning and the role of institutions in 
socio-economic systems, it is worth starting by considering Polanyi’s analysis of 
three forms of integration between economic and social relationships: reciprocity, 
redistribution and exchange (Polanyi, 1957). The significant element of Polanyi’s 
analysis is that he identifies institutions that allow reciprocity, redistribution and 
exchange – which in themselves are only three different types of interactions –  to 
give unity and stability to the integration between economy and society. In particular, 
he argues that the institution which allows reciprocity to integrate economic and 
social relations within a community that practises the exchange of gifts is, for 
example, a symmetrical system of kinship groups. Similarly the presence of an 
allocative center with the power to redistribute resources, such as the state or other 
less durable entities, it is a form of integration. Finally, the system of price-making 
markets is, according to Polanyi, the institution that gives unity and stability to 
exchange relationships, making the exchange a form of integration.  
Following Max Weber, Polanyi identifies market economy as characterized by 
rational choices under scarcity. He accepts the idea, typical of marginalist economic 
theory, that market prices, balancing demand and supply on all markets, are able to 
coordinate individual choices of production and consumption. To carry out this 
coordination function, however, demand and supply functions of the traditional 
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theory of prices must be derived from individual rational choices by consumers and 
firms. In this way, the market is transformed into an abstract model of optimal 
allocation of resources, which axiomatically assumes that the individual choices are 
the result of constrained maximization of profit and utility in conditions of perfect 
competition. In the pure neoclassical economic theory, the market rules out the 
presence of  relationships between agents. As noted by Hirschman: “Under perfect 
competition there is no room for bargaining, negotiation, remonstration or mutual 
adjustment and the various operators that contract together need not enter into 
recurrent or continuing relationships as a result of which they would get to know each 
other well” (1982, p. 1473)8.  
In what follows, to define markets as social institutions I will refer, by contrast, 
to a price theory of classical inspiration, according to which prices emerge from 
social conventions and power relationships governing the distribution of income 
between wages and profits. I consider this concept of price formation as the first of 
two essential theoretical premises of the  definition of markets in terms of recurring 
patterns of interaction between agents and artifacts9. The second premise of such a 
definition is that  markets are governed by a set of social institutions. These are, for 
example: the system of explicit and implicit contracts on legal markets, the system of 
agreements and constraints on illegal markets (Hodgson, 1989), the unwritten rules 
that govern interactions between producers and between producers and consumers 
(Brusco, 1999). While different social institutions contribute to formulate different 
systems of incentives that guide agents’ behavior in market systems, markets as social 
institutions cannot be regarded in any way as a self-regulating mechanism. 
 
3.4 Markets in  context  
 
The entities defined above are embedded in wider sets of social relationships. 
To indicate these wider sets of relationships, I use the word context in its 
etymological meaning10 according to which context can be defined as the set of 
circumstances interwoven with a phenomenon (and its development). The peculiar 
characteristic of a context is that, once it emerges, it helps to give meaning to what is 
embedded in it by making the interpretation of a phenomenon less ambiguous. 
                                                 
8 See also Stigler (1946) and Hayek (1949) who explicitly exclude from perfect competition all 
personal relationships of any kind between the economic units. 
9 Lane and Maxfield (2005, p. 36) define a market system as “a set of agents that engage with one 
another in recurring patterns of interaction, organized around an evolving family of artifacts”. 
10 From Latin contextus, derived from contexere, that means to weave together, to interweave. 
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To make less ambiguous the definitions of agents, artifacts and markets we 
need to define a context for such entities. It is worth focusing our attention on the 
definition of a context for markets as loci of interaction between agents and artifacts. 
Markets as places of exchange of surplus produced by individuals and communities 
are ancient institutions. The first industrial revolution brought about a profound 
change in the function of markets in social organization, transforming them into a 
means to realize private industrial profits. After the  first industrial revolution, 
production for a potential demand, a demand whose quantitative and qualitative 
dimension was not known in advance, forced producers to adjust production capacity 
to expected demand and to sell at a price not lower than that at which a normal profit 
could be achieved. But to realize profit entails selling and reaching new potential 
consumers. This imposes new relations between production and consumption. These 
transformations, in turn, interacted with the change of meanings and functions of 
other preexisting institutions of social organizations, such as for example  the  
division of labour11.    
Against this historical and institutional background –  which represents a wide 
context in which agents, artifacts and markets are embedded – I will attempt to give 
an example of how specific dimensions of the market context can be considered in 
terms of how competition works. Economists refer to two different types of 
competition: price competition and product competition. In the basic formulation, for 
homogenous products and atomistic production, price competition prevails. Although 
this representation of competition is present in economics textbooks, it probably does 
not exist in reality. In fact, for the generality of manufactured products, innovations 
and differentiations are the norm and, for commodities, monopolies prevail. It follows 
that we must concentrate our attention on imperfect competition, and product 
competition in particular, as the prevailing form of competition. Product competition 
is the result of firms’ strategies and product characteristics and requires the capacity 
to innovate and differentiate products and services. Product competition emerges with 
different specific characteristics for each market by shaping market relationships, for 
example, in terms of different types of organization of production and sales, different 
types of global localization of production and different (and new) market institutions. 
It is a specific dimension of market context created by firms that changes over time. 
The example just discussed suggests that market context helps to make more accurate 
(and less ambiguous) the notions of agents, artifacts and markets by considering how 
that context emerges. In a similar way, the emergence of other specific dimensions of 
                                                 
11 I will return to this in section 5. 
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market context could be examined, such as, for example, different forms of 
globalization and financialization. 
4. The emergence of new functionalities, new artifacts and new markets: how we 
can analyze this process of emergence 
The exaptation perspective discussed in the previous pages leads us to focus 
attention on the processes of transformation triggered by initial attributions of new 
functionalities to existing entities. It is worth returning for a moment to the case of 
feathers, whose original function was that of thermoregulation. Feathers do not lose 
this function, but they acquire another completely new functionality of being useful 
to flight. This new functionality, however, did not exist before living beings with 
feathers soared through the air. In other words, the new functionality of feathers 
emerged along with their transformation in order to become apt to a new emergent 
functionality that did not exist before. 
With regard to artifacts, at least in a first approximation, we might be led to 
believe that the new functionalities attributed to existing artifacts designed for other 
purposes already exist12. However, the analysis of the exaptation processes allows us 
to understand the ways in which the emergence of new specific functionalities takes 
place. In fact, by exploring the exaptation process we can analyze how new artifacts 
such as the wireless telegraph, the jukebox or surgical laser instruments are able to 
provide functionalities that presumably did not exist before: wireless telegraph allows 
us voice communication at a distance from sea to land, the jukebox reproduces sound 
but automatically and surgical laser instruments allow micro-surgery. These new 
functionalities emerged along with the new artifacts developed to provide the new 
functionalities initially attributed to them. In other words, the initial attribution of a 
new functionality changes the context in which an artifact is used giving rise to new 
artifacts able to provide new functionalities that did not exist before. Significant 
aspects of these processes of change can be analysed in terms of a theoretical 
framework essentially based on processes that activate processes (Lane, 2011; 
Bonifati, 2013). This framework can be illustrated by distinguishing three different 
levels of analysis focusing on: (a) attribution of functionalities; (b) development of 
artifacts; (c) production-consumption networks (see fig. 3).  
                                                 
12 The functionality to communicate at a distance, for example, already existed when Marconi 
attributed it to Hertz’s laboratory tool designed to measure electromagnetic waves (the wired 
telegraph provided this functionality). The same can be said for the new functionalities attributed to 
Edison’s dictating machine or to laser technology. 
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At the attribution of functionalities level, the analysis focuses on the actions of 
individuals (or groups of individuals) which attribute functionalities by using (or 
producing) existing artifacts and communicate the new information to the potential 
producers (or to potential users). At the development of artifacts level, the analysis 
focuses on the attempts by producers to produce, by interacting with users, artifacts 
with appropriate structures to provide functionalities attributed to them. 
Complementary technologies can be developed and functionalities can be better 
defined by users and/or by producers. As a consequence, functionalities can co-
evolve with the development of technologies and products. The production-
consumption networks level considers that, in order to be produced and sold, new 
artifacts must be placed in a wider network of interactions involving new 
relationships between firms and between producers and customers. At this level of 









Fig. 3 Processes that activate processes in the analysis of the emergence of new functionalities, new 
artifacts and new relationships  
 
 
A crucial aspect of this theoretical framework concerns two feedbacks acting as 
mechanisms of activation of the processes of attribution of functionalities (see fig. 3).  
Functionalities can emerge both from producers in the process of developing a 
product and from users and producers who in new production-consumption networks 
(new markets) interact with many others agents and artifacts. To return to the example 
of the wireless telegraph, when, in 1897, Marconi founded the Wireless Telegraph 
and Signal Company it was not clear what markets the new artifact would serve. 
From the initial first customers – the British Army and Navy – a new and broader 
market was built.  The new organized system of relationships around the wireless 
telegraphy activated a new functionality for wireless communication technology –  
the transmission of sound – giving rise to the emergence of new artifacts (Basalla, 
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5. The emergence of new functionalities at the level of the organization of the 
economy and society 
The main implication of the exaptation-based perspective highlighted above is 
that it leads to an analysis of economic change in terms of emergent phenomena and 
in particular in terms of the emergence of new specific functionalities deriving from 
intersecting processes giving rise to qualitatively new entities and relationships. In the 
previous section, I discussed these processes with reference to the relationships 
between agents and artifacts. Economic change has been discussed with reference to 
innovation processes in agent-artifact space. In the present section, I will try to 
discuss briefly the main implication of the exaptation-based perspective from the 
point of view of the organization of the economy and society. In particular, I will refer 
to what can be considered an essential character of all forms of society: the division 
of labour which, as history teaches us, came into being along with the first forms of 
societies. 
As is well known, Adam Smith sees the division of labour as the source of the 
growth of wealth. The interaction between specialization, within and among 
productive activities, market expansion and productivity growth gives rise to dynamic 
economies of scale and to income and wealth growth. Smith considered the division 
of labour as a natural element of human behavior. According to him, the division of 
labour “from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of 
any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it 
gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual, consequence of a 
certain propensity of human nature which has in view no such extensive utility;  the 
propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another” (Smith, 1776 [1976], 
p. 17). 
This conception of the division of labour does not give us a full understanding 
of the historical origins of the division of labour and of the transformation of its 
characteristics and its functions. To achieve such a comprehension we need a 
different perspective, important elements of which we can find in Marx’s analysis of 
the division of labour. Marx sees the division of labour as the organizational form of 
the relations of production both in the production units and in society. By considering 
how the division of labour changes with changes both in the relations between means 
of production and human labour and in the relationship between production and 
consumption (demand), Marx offers us a rich example of the analysis of changes in 
the functions of the division of labour from early tribal societies to modern capitalist 
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society13. As an example, I will refer here briefly to Marx’s analysis of change in 
characteristics and functions of division of labour from manufacture to capitalist 
mode of production. 
 
5.1 The changing characteristics and functions of the division of labour emerging 
from the historical processes of interaction between quantitative and qualitative 
changes of production relations 
 
According to Marx, manufacture, defined as a production system in which most 
craftsmen work at the same time under the same roof, is a response to the expansion 
of markets triggered by the separation between production and trade and by the 
development of long-distance trade. Manufacture represents the production base of 
the mercantile system (in which trade dominates production). If we focus only on the 
production of the same sort of commodity by a large number of craftsmen working at 
the same time and in the same place, manufacture, Marx argues, “can hardly be 
distinguished, in its earliest stages, from the handicraft trades [Handwerksindustrie] 
of the guilds, except by the greater number of workers simultaneously employed by 
the same individual capital. It is merely an enlargement of the workshop of the master 
craftsman of the guilds. At first, then, the difference is purely quantitative” (Marx, 
1867 [1990], p. 439). Marx, however, was interested primarily in the qualitative 
changes of the division of labour triggered by quantitative changes. At two different 
but coexistent levels of analysis, Marx analyses how a growth in the scale of 
production (a quantitative change) leads to two types of qualitative changes between 
the handicraft trades of the guilds and capitalist manufacture. The first type of 
qualitative difference is that in manufacture the capitalist, in order to start production 
on a large scale, must anticipate, at the very least, a sum far greater than the 
maximum amount of money advanced by the craftsman: “… the possessor of money 
or commodities actually turns into a capitalist only where the minimum advanced for 
production greatly exceeds the known medieval maximum” (ibid, p. 423)14.  
This, at a certain point, changes the qualitative relationship between labour, the 
means of production and the labour process: “If we consider the process of 
production from the point of view of the simple labour-process, the worker is related 
to the means of production, not in their quality of capital, but as being the mere 
                                                 
13 See Marx and Engels (1845-46) and Marx (1867 [1990]), in particular chapters 13-15. 
14 Marx adds: “Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel, in 
his Logic, that at a certain point merely quantitative differences pass over by a dialectical inversion 
into qualitative distinctions” (ibid, p. 423). 
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means and material of his own purposeful productive activity. … But it is different as 
soon as we view the production process as a process of  valorization. The means of 
production are at once changed into means for the absorption of the labour of others. 
It is no longer the worker who employs the means of production, but the means of 
production which employ the worker.” (ibid, p. 425). 
Marx connects, as a component of the analysis of a one and only process, the 
analysis of this first qualitative change to a second type of qualitative change, that 
concerning the labour process under manufacture mode of production. “Even without 
an alteration in the method of production of work, the simultaneous employment of a 
large number of workers produces a revolution in the objective conditions of the 
labour process” (ibid, p. 441). The sources of this revolution are numerous and of 
different types. Here, I summarize them schematically15: 
(i) Economies in the use of means of production by the mere fact that these 
means of production are used together by many workers.  
(ii) In general, the potential of many workers working together is greater than the 
sum of the individual working potential. Some indivisible operations can be 
made only with the combined work of many workers. 
(iii) In working together, “mere social contact begets in the most productive 
workers a rivalry and a stimulation of ‘animal spirits’, which heightens  the 
efficiency of each individual worker” (ibid, p. 443). 
(iv) The division of labour between different operations of the production process 
leads to a reduction of the production time through the  simultaneous 
realization of different sequential stages in the production process. 
 
As each craftsman carries out his job in the production of a single commodity, 
he loses the ability to exercise the ancient craft  in its entirety and ends up becoming a 
“partial worker”, exercising his job in a single operation. Cooperation, which initially 
appeared as the work of many craftsmen at the same time under the same roof, thus 
becomes a new form of division of labour based on the division of tasks. This process 
of change presents different (and in some way opposite) characteristics for different 
types of artifacts. “A carriage, for example, was formerly the product of a great 
number of independent craftsmen, such as wheelwrights, harness-maker, glaziers, 
painters, polishers, gilders … At first, the manufacture of carriages appeared as a 
combination of various independent handcrafts. But it gradually began to signify the 
splitting-up of carriage production into its various detailed operations, and each single 
                                                 
15 See in particular Marx (1867 [1990]), pp. 442-451. 
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operation crystallized into the exclusive function of a particular worker, the 
manufacture as a whole being performed by these partial workers in conjunction” 
(ibid, pp. 455-456). 
In the production of other types of artifacts, the capitalist employs many 
craftsmen, each producing the same, or similar, goods, as happens for example in the 
production of paper, types or needles. At first, the craftsman performs all the tasks of 
the production process until, with the increase of the scale of production, the work is 
divided into individual tasks and each craftsman specializes in the execution of a 
single task or in a few operations. At first it is just an accidental division of labour 
which, however, since it brings advantages, is repeated in a recurrent way until it 
becomes a systematic division of labour (see ibid, p. 456). 
Between the division of labour in manufacture and the division of labour in 
society there is a two-way link. On the one hand, manufacture requires a certain 
minimum level of development of division of labour in society, necessary for 
capitalist production and  the circulation of commodities. On the other hand, 
however, “the division of labour in manufacture reacts back upon the society, 
developing and multiplying it further” (ibid, p. 473). In fact, the division of labour in 
manufacture differentiates at the same time both jobs and instruments of labour.  
“With  the differentiation of the instruments of labour, the trades which produce these 
instruments themselves become more and more differentiated” (ibid, p. 473). 
Another aspect of the link between quantitative and qualitative changes in the 
analysis of the division of labour by Marx concerns the transition from manufacture 
to large-scale industry, which I will only discuss briefly here16. In manufacture, the 
cooperation and the division of labour in all their forms are based on the handicraft 
trades of the guilds. The relationship between workers and instruments of labour 
continues to be that typical of  the handicraft trades of the guilds in which the worker 
is both the driving force and true creator of the product with the aid of the instruments 
of labour. A typical example, Marx argues, is the spinning-wheel in which “the foot is 
merely the prime mover …, while the hand, working with the spindle, and drawing 
and twisting, performs the real operation of spinning” (ibid, pp. 495-496). The 
expansion of the potential markets and the introduction of new machines in the mid-
eighteenth century change the relationship between the worker and the instruments of 
labour  and the very nature of the division of labor. The machines introduced in the 
Industrial Revolution are, in fact, new machines that replace the worker in the 
                                                 
16 See Marx (1867 [1990]), chapter  15 (Machinery and Large-Scale Industry), in particular pp. 492-
508,  544-553, 588-610. 
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realization of the product, as is the case of the machines that allow spinners to spin 
without the intervention of the human hand. The human driving force becomes no 
longer sufficient and is replaced by steam engines, already invented in the late 17th 
century. The new operating machines revolutionize the steam engine which becomes 
the new driving force capable of simultaneously providing energy to many machines. 
Manufacture is replaced by modern large-scale industry in which the role of the 
workers is to supervise one or, more frequently, several machines. Even the character 
of the division of labour changes. “Along with the tool, the skill of the worker in 
handling it passes over the machine. The capabilities of the tool are emancipated from 
the restraints inseparable from human labour-power. This destroys the technical 
foundation on which the division of labour in manufacture was based. Hence, in place 
of the hierarchy of specialized workers that characterizes manufacture, there appears, 
in the automatic factory, a tendency to equalize and reduce to an identical level every 
kind of work that has to be done by the minders of the machine” (ibid, p. 545). 
The division of labour in large-scale industry becomes purely technical. It 
“takes the form primarily of a distribution of workers among the specialized 
machines, and of quantities of workers, who do not however form organized groups, 
among the various departments of the factory … The organized group peculiar of the 
manufacture is replaced by the connection between the head worker and his few 
assistants. The essential division is that between workers who are actually employed 
on the machine (among whom are included a few who look after the engine) and 
those who merely attend them (almost exclusively children). … This division of 
labour is purely technical” (ibid, pp. 545-546). 
To conclude, the division of labour, in manufacture first and in large scale 
industry later, becomes a form of organization of social production whose origin and 
function cannot be attributed to any spontaneous inclination of human nature to 
barter, as was thought by Smith, and cannot be deduced from its actual utility. The 
new social function of the division of labour emerges along with a qualitative 
transformation of the mode of production. It follows that the capitalist division of 
labour – which separates individual activities and makes them independent, both in 
factory and in society – is new in quality. It assumes the new function, that did not 
exist before, of making possible the production of commodities for expanding 
potential markets.  Along with this new function, the capitalist division of labour 
requires a new function of coordination through which it makes possible the re-
composition of labour in commodities production. In the factory, Marx argues, such a 
function – which, likewise, did not exist before – is provided by the capitalist power 
of authority over workers. In society, instead, the capitalist division of labour gives 
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rise to “a motley pattern of distribution of the producers and their means of 
production among the various branches of social labour … Division of labour within 
the workshop implies the undisputed authority of the capitalist over men, who are 
merely the numbers of a total mechanism which belongs to him. The division of 
labour within society brings into contact independent producers, who acknowledge 
no authority other than that of competition …“ (ibid, pp. 476-477). 
In his analysis, Marx devotes much attention to the effects of the new 
characteristics of the division of labour on working conditions, examining, for 
example, the working hours and the working day.  He attaches great importance to the 
outcome of the struggle for a normal working day and a compulsory limitation of 
working hours. In particular, Marx considers the “factory legislation … just as much 
the necessary product of large-scale industry as cotton yarn, self-actors and the 
electric telegraph” (ibid. p. 610). It is worth emphasizing that Marx considers the 
extension of factory legislation, which did not exist before, as a characteristic feature 
of the new mode of production. Where such legislation does not exist or is less 
extensive, capitalist development could be very different from England, where 
factory legislation originated and spread across the country17. As noted by 
Hirschman, in this consideration Marx shows “a very acute sense of small and critical 
differences” (Hirschman, 1977, p. 89-90). It seems to me that this “acute sense of 
small and critical differences” could be attributed to Marx’s awareness that in 
emergent phenomena small differences can generate significant different outcomes 
and that, as a consequence,  economic and social processes may not follow fixed 
paths18. 
In Marx's analysis, changes in the characteristics and functions of the division 
of labour are closely related to the historical changes of production relations. This 
analysis allows him to bring to light new functions of the division of labour that never 
existed before. At the same time, it protects firmly from the error of believing that the 
origin of the division of labour can be deduced from its current utility. Marx's critique 
of Smith's ideas about the origin of the division of labour is a demonstration of his 
                                                 
17 See Marx’s considerations in the Preface to the first Capital edition (Marx, 1867 [1990], p. 91). 
18 In Marx, broad generalizations, that seem to have a deterministic flavour, and careful analysis of 
processes, that tend to discriminate and to produce specific results not deducible from broad 
generalizations, coexist. The relationship between these two aspects of Marx's thought goes beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
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awareness that the current function of the division of labour must be separated from 
its historical origin19. 
 
5.2 A critical view of Spencer’s and Durkheim’s functionalist analysis of the division 
of labour 
 
In re-reading Marx’s analysis of the division of labour in the light of the general 
phenomenon of emergence of new functionalities, new entities and new relationships, 
we can find a valuable clue to analyzing how changes in functionalities occur at the 
level of the organization of the economy and society. In fact, Marx's analysis suggests 
that changes in the characteristics and functions of the division of labour are closely 
related to the historical processes of interaction between quantitative and qualitative 
changes of production relations20. This re-reading of Marx analysis of the division of 
labour contains arguments against Marx’s alleged technological determinism21. In 
what remains of the present section, I will argue that Marx's analysis of changing 
characteristics  of the division of labour contains an ante litteram critique of the 
functionalist analysis of the division of labour by Spencer and Durkheim. 
The idea that evolution is the result of a natural selection process that leads to a 
given relationship between structure and function has been the basis of one of the 
currents of social analysis. In particular, according to Spencer (1876-1896), in 
agreement with what happens in the case of biological organisms, the differentiation 
of the social structures and functions are the result of population growth. New 
structures and new features are developed in order to ensure the society's survival in 
the face of changes in its size and/or in the external environment. According to this 
vision, which uses the biological analogy in order to explain society’s structures and 
functions, each function provides a specific purpose and thus helps to ensure the 
survival of the social organism. It follows that, as each organ is selected by the 
                                                 
19 See for example the following statement in Marx’s A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy (1859): “though it is correct to say that individual exchange presupposes division of labour, 
it is wrong to maintain that division of labour presupposes individual exchange. For example, 
division of labour had reached an exceptionally high degree of development among the Peruvians, 
although no individual exchange, no exchange of products in the form of commodities, took place”. 
For a similar statement, see Marx (1867 [1990]), p. 132.  
20 The role of the interaction between quantitative and qualitative changes in the relations of 
production in Marx's analysis of the division of labor, is neglected by Leijonhufvud (1986 and 1995) 
who examines the division of labor in purely technological terms and establishes a close relationship 
of continuity between Smith and Marx. 
21 For arguments against Marx’s alleged technological determinism see Rosenberg (1976), in particular 
pp. 36-39, and Mac Kenzie (1984), in particular pp. 473-480. 
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process of natural selection to ensure a given function, then each component of 
society, and each structure is connected to a function through a process of social 
selection22. Of particular interest for our purposes are Spencer’s ideas about the 
natural tendency to specialization and division of labour. With population growth and 
with the diffusion and development of cities, individuals tend to differentiate and 
specialize their activities according to the differences arising from the natural 
environmental circumstances in which they find themselves. According to Spencer, 
this tendency is a sufficient condition to explain the division of labour. In fact, he 
assumes that men act according to a utilitarian conduct searching for the minimum 
pain and maximum profit. Since the division of labour, by increasing the productive 
power of labour, achieves this objective, Spencer implicitly assumes that, if the 
growth of the population leads to specialization, the division of labour necessarily 
will occurs. 
Durkheim (1893) accepts the Spencerian biological metaphor, and the 
underlying vision of evolution, but provides a more rigorous adaptationist analysis of 
the division of labour. According to Durkheim (1893), with the growth of social 
relations competition among individuals increases. The division of labour is the 
answer to a dose of competition unbearable for individuals, who, in order not to be 
destroyed, differentiate their activities looking for niches for survival. In this view, it 
follows that the division of labour is the result of an adaptation to a purpose, the 
reduction of competition in favor of forms of “organic solidarity”. As highlighted by 
Gould (2002, p. 1239), Catton refers to the concept of exaptation to criticize this 
adaptationist thesis by Durkheim. Indeed, Catton argues, Durkheim's thesis implies 
that mutual relationships have developed in order to reduce competition. However, 
biologists have shown that in many cases mutualism develops from pre-existing 
forms of antagonism and exploitation. “Durkheim – Catton argues – would have been 
astonished to learn that most mutualistic relationships have probably evolved from 
                                                 
22 This organismic and functionalist vision of society, proposed by Spencer on the basis of its 
particular interpretation of evolution, taken to its extreme, formed the theoretical and cultural 
background for social analysis that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century becomes known 
as “social Darwinism”. La Vergata (1995) pointed out that in Spencer’s  thought the two metaphors of 
social organism and ‘struggle for life’ have a common root. They made their first appearance in the 
first Spencer’s book, Social Statistics (1851). “More important – La Vergata argues – they were used 
for the same basic purpose: a plea for noninterference with the spontaneous development of society, 
which is gradual, unalterable, and self-adjusting. Although the organic analogy was not developed as 
much as the idea of competition was, it is evident that they supported each other and were 





host-parasite, predatory-prey, or plant-herbivore interactions rather than ... among 
formerly competing conspecifics. There are initially antagonistic interactions (e.g. 
predatory-prey pairs) in which selection pressures, over time, convert them directly 
into mutualism ... without the conversion passing through to neutral phase” (Catton, 
2002, p. 104). In others words, according to Catton, the source of Durkheim’s error is 
in his disregarding the functional shift principle: “Evolutionary Ecologists now know 
that mutualism evolves by some adaptation of structure or behavior that changes the 
outcome of an interaction from which the parties can not withdraw” (ibid , p. 105). 
It is particularly interesting for our purposes to note that both Spencer and 
Durkheim consider the effects of quantitative changes in population on the division of 
labour in terms of adaptations: Spencer considers the division of labour as a 
spontaneous adaptation to changing external conditions determined by an increased 
population; Durkheim considers it as a result of a process that, by limiting the 
disruptive effects of competition, leads to forms of organic solidarity. Neither, 
however, are able to see what seems to be clear to Marx: namely that quantitative 
variations trigger processes of qualitative change of the forms of the division of 
labour already existing, giving rise to new functions and new entities. 
An inherent limitation in adaptationist explanations of the relationship between 
structure and function in social systems, is that they fix this relationship.  In the same 
way as cells and organs have a given structural relationship with an evolved body, so 
the members of a society have a given structural relationship with the society at a 
given stage of evolution. In a society that has developed the division of labour, the 
different individual entities (individuals, enterprises) have a given structural 
relationship with the society, in the same way as,  in the Durkheim’s vision, the 
function of the division of labour seems to be given and invariant. It follows that it 
seems difficult to give an account of the changes in the characteristics and functions 
of the division of labour. Since the forms and the very function of the division of 
labour have changed historically, the adaptationist and functionalist perspectives 
seem do not to be adequate for an analysis of  these changes. The perspective based 
on exaptations, instead, by focusing on changes in functionalities and in the related 
emergence of new entities and new relationships, seems to represent an alternative 
able to  grasp the processes of change. In particular, this perspective can represent a 
guide to analyze  the changing characteristics and functions of the division of labour 
starting from its current characteristics and functions.  
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6. Concluding remarks on the implications of the notion of exaptation for a 
theory of economic change 
According to the adaptation-based paradigm, natural selection shapes the 
structure of entities for a current function. It follows that adaptation through selection 
leads to a given relationship between structure and a pre-existent function. If the 
functionality of an entity is considered as an end,  known in advance, toward which 
natural selection is directed, the origin of an entity can be deduced from its current 
functionality.  
The exaptation-based perspective highlighted in this paper focuses instead on 
changes in functionalities as a result of emergent phenomena. According to this 
perspective, entities, previously shaped or not for a particular function, are coopted 
for a new use, giving rise to new entities and new relationships among entities. It 
follows that the origin of an entity cannot be deduced from its current functionality. 
To trace the origin of an entity it is necessary to examine the historical process of 
change giving rise new functionalities and new entities. The implications of the 
notion of exaptation for the analysis of economic change derive from the essential 
characteristics of the processes of emergence of new entities triggered by an initial 
attribution of new functionalities. To summarize the implications that have emerged 
in this paper, I will refer here to two general considerations. 
The first concerns the necessity to examine the processes of change in socio-
economic systems in terms of an interaction-based ontology. Section 3 contains an 
attempt to define agents, artifacts and socio-economic institutions – three 
fundamental entities in socio-economic systems – in terms of such an ontology. I used 
this ontology to highlight how processes of economic change can be analysed in 
terms of emergent phenomena and in particular in terms of the emergence of new 
specific functionalities and  qualitatively new entities and relationships. In section 4 I 
referred these processes to the relationships between agent and artifacts, and in 
section 5 to the organization of the economy and society. 
The second general consideration, on which I will focus here more extensively, 
is the following. If changes of functionalities are emergent phenomena, economic 
change cannot be analysed in terms of a mere recombination of existing things or in 
terms of selection-variation mechanisms23. It must be analysed through the dynamic 
                                                 
23 In previous works (see Bonifati, 2010 and 2013; Bonifati and Villani, 2013) I provided a critical 
discussion of: (1) the Schumpeterian theory of economic change as “creative response in history” 
(Schumpeter, 1947); (2) the evolutionary theory of economic change by Nelson e Winter (1982); and 
(3) the theory of technological development based on the notion of speciation (see Adner, R. and 
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historical process by which “a new thing leads to another”. In these processes of 
transformation the causality links are themselves the results of processes in which ex 
ante potential causality links can be transformed into different (and new) effective (or 
actual) causality links. 
The idea that socio-economic development is the story of how one thing leads 
to another is proper to Hirschman’s conception of development (Hirschman, 1958 and 
1977). One of the great merits of Hirschman’s generalized linkage approach to 
development is its capacity to orient research towards the analysis of complex 
inducing mechanisms of economic development, at a specific fine-scale of 
investigation and in conditions of uncertainty both on the demand and supply side 
(Hirschman, 1967, chapter 2). This approach is a strong antidote against the 
temptation to explain development (and underdevelopment) in terms of elements 
external to the development processes themselves, such as, for example, the presence 
(or absence) of pre-requisites. However, it seems to be different from the exaptation-
based perspective with respect to an important element: the role of the social process 
of change of functionalities seems to be underestimated and the possibility that the 
occurrence of changes of functionality may give rise to different (and new) causality 
links might, as a consequence, be blurred in the linkage approach. 
Hirschman's theory of development has a non-deterministic character, and this 
makes it open to taking into account the exaptation phenomena. Hirschman’s 
generalized linkage approach and the exaptation-based perspective seem to be 
complementary, a conclusion strengthened by considering two features of 
Hirschman’s generalized linkage approach. The first one is that, according to 
Hirschman, development is essentially a process of  mobilization (activation) of 
potentialities already present, albeit latent, in ongoing activities’ characteristics. This 
first feature leads to the second one: linkages as “investment-generating forces” are 
dynamic in nature and they lead to new activities. It follows that the realization of 
linkages is connected, by its nature, to dynamic phenomena, like innovation and 
product differentiation24: as highlighted above, it is hard to think of processes of 
innovation and product differentiation regardless of the social processes of change of 
functionalities. 
                                                                                                                                           
Levinthal, 2002 and Levinthal, 1998). For a wider critical discussion of the use of biological 
metaphors in economics see Ginzburg (2009). 




Adner, R. and Levinthal, D.A. (2002), The Emergence of Emerging Technologies. 
California Management Review 45, no. 1: 50-66. 
Basalla, G. (1988), The Evolution of Technology, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Bonifati, G. (2010), “More is different”, exaptation and uncertainty: three 
foundational concepts for a complexity theory of innovation, Economics of 
Innovation and New Technology, 19:8, pp. 743-760. 
Bonifati, G. (2011), The capacity to generate investment. An Analysis of the long-
term determinants of investment, in Ciccone, R., Gehrke, C., e Mongiovi, G. 
(Eds.), Sraffa and modern economics. London; New York: Routledge 
Bonifati, G. (2013), Exaptation and emerging degeneracy in innovation processes, 
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 22:1, pp. 1-21. 
Bonifati, G. and Villani, M. (2013), Exaptation in innovation processes: theory and 
models, in Grandori, A. (ed), Handbook of economic organization, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Brusco. S. (1999), The rules of the game in industrial districts, in A. Grandori (ed), 
Interfirm networks: organization and industrial competitiveness, London: 
Routledge. 
Catton, W.R. Jr. (2002), Has the Durkheim Legacy Misled Sociology? in Dunlap, 
R.E., Buttel, F.H., Dickens, P., Gijswijt, A. (eds), Sociological Theory and the 
Environment. Classical Foundations, Contemporary Insights, Plymount: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Dew, N., Sarasvathy, S.D. and Venkataraman, S. (2004), The economic implications 
of exaptation. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 14: 69-84. 
Durkheim, É. (1893), De la division du travail social, Paris: F. Alcan. 
Engels, F. (1883), Dialectics of Nature, English translation available online: 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works. 
Ginzburg, A. (2009), Biological Metaphors in Economics: Natural Selection and 
Competition, in Lane, D., Pumain, D.A., van der Leeuw, S.E. and West, G. 
(eds), Complexity perspective in innovation and social change, Berlin: 
Springer-Verlag. 
Ginzburg, A. (2014), L’attualità di un dissenziente: l’idea di sviluppo in Albert O. 
Hirschman, Moneta e Credito, vol. 67, n. 266, pp. 205-226. 




Gould, S.J. and Lewontin, R. (1979), The spandrels of san Marco and the Panglossian 
paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme, Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B, 
205, pp. 581-598. 
Gould, S.J. and E.S. Vrba, (1982), Exaptation – a missing term in the science of form, 
Paleobiology 8 (1), pp. 4-15. 
Hayek, F. A. (1949), The Meaning of Competition, in Individualism and Economic 
Order, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.  
Hirschman, A. O. (1958), The Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Hirschman, A. O. (1967), Development Project Observed, Washington D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution. 
Hirschman, A. O. (1977), A Generalized Linkage Approach to Development, with 
Special Reference to Staples, in Hirschman, A. O., Essays in Trespassing. 
Economics to politics and beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1981. 
Hirschman, A. O. (1982), Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, 
Destructive, or Feeble?, Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XX, December, 
pp. 1463-1484. 
Hodgson, G. (1989), Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern 
Institutional Economics, Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Keynes, J.M. (1937), The General Theory of Employment, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, February 1937, in Collected Writings, vol. XIV, London: 
Macmillan 1983. 
La Vergata, A. (1995), Herbert Spencer: Biology, Sociology, and Cosmic Evolution, 
in Maasen, S. et al (eds), Biology as Society, Society as Biology: Metaphors, 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Lane, D.A. (2011) Complexity and Innovation Dynamics, in Antonelli, C. (ed.), 
Handbook on the economic complexity of technological change, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Lane, D.A. and Maxfield, R. (2005) Ontological uncertainty and innovation, Journal 
of Evolutionary Economics 15, pp. 3-50. 
Lane, D.A., R. Maxfield, D. Read, and S. van der Leeuw. (2009) From population to 
organization thinking, in Lane, D.A., Pumain, D., van der Leeuw, S.E. and 
West, G. (eds), Complexity perspective in innovation and social change, 
Berlin: Springer-Verlag.  
Lass, R. (1990),  How to Do Things with Junk: Exaptation in Language Evolution, 
Journal of Linguistics, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 79-102.  
29 
 
Leijonhufvud, A. (1986), Capitalism and the Factory System, in R. N. Langlois  (ed.), 
Economic as a Process: Essays in the New Institutional Economics, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 203-223.  
Leijonhufvud, A. (1995), The Individual, the Market and the Industrial Division of 
Labor, in C. Mongardini (ed.), L'individuo e il mercato, Roma: Bulzoni 
Editore, pp. 61-78. 
Levins, R.  and Lewontin, R. (1985), The dialectical biologist, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 
Levinthal, D. A. (1998) The Slow Pace of Rapid Technological Change: Gradualism 
and Punctuation in Technological Change, Industrial and Corporate Change, 
7 no. 2, pp. 217-247. 
Mac Kenzie, D. (1984), Marx and the Machine, Technology and Culture, Vol.25, n. 3, 
July, pp. 473-502. 
Marx, K. (1859), A contribution to the critique of political economy, trans. from the 
German by S.W. Ryazanskaya, ed. M. Dobb. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 
English translation available online: 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works 
Marx, C. (1867), Capital. A critique of Political Economy, Volume One, Pengiun 
Books, London 1990. 
Marx, C. and Engels, F. (1845-46), A Critique of the German Ideology. English 
translation available online: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works  
Mokyr, J. (2000), Evolutionary phenomena in technological change, in Ziman, J. (ed), 
Technological Innovation as an Evolutionary Process, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge pp. 52-65. 
Nelson, Richard R. and Sidney G. Winter (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of 
Economic Change, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Nietzsche F. (1887), On the Genealogy of Morals (translated by W. Kaufmann), New 
York: Vintage 1967. 
Polanyi, K. (1957), The Economy as Instituted Process, in K. Polanyi, C.M. 
Arensberg and H. W. Pearson (eds), Trade and Markets in Early Empires, 
Economies in History and Theory, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press & The 
Falcon’s Press. 
Rosenberg, N. (1976), Marx as a student of technology, Monthly  Review, Vol. 28, 
July-August, pp. 56-77, reprinted in N. Rosenberg, Inside the Black Box: 
Technology and Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982 
30 
 
Rosenberg, N. (1996) Uncertainty and technological change, in Landau R., T. Taylor, 
and G. Wrigth (eds), The mosaic of economic growth, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Schumpeter, J. (1947), The Creative Response in History, Journal of Economic 
History, vol. 7, pp. 149-159. 
Smith, A. (1776), An Inquire into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations, 
Cannan edition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1976 
Spencer, H. (1876-1896), The Principles of Sociology, London; Edinburgh: Williams 
and Norgate,  vol. 1, 1876 ; vol. 2, 1893; vol. 3, 1896.  
Stigler, G.J. (1946), The Theory of Price, New York: Macmillan. 
Traugott, E. C. (2004) Exaptation and Grammaticalization, in Minoji Akimoto (ed.), 
Linguistic Studies Based on Corpora, Tokyo: Hituzi Syobo Publishing Co. 
Vygotskij, L. S. (1978), Mind in Society: Development of Higher Psychological 
Processes, Cambridge MA.: Harvard University Press. 
